aol.pmTHE HISTORICAL HACKING CATALOG

Independent research index / First release

Hardware, from the board to the chip

Follow a concrete artifact through its components, documentation, and behavior. This is a learning path, not a single historical chronology.

Source review: 16 October 2026 · Original editorial overview

A badge as an inspectable system

Joe Grand’s DEF CON 14 badge from 2006 combines a PIC10F202, LEDs, and a button with published design documentation. Microchip classifies the PIC10F202 as a microcontroller. The example ties a visible behavior to a small programmable device, its circuit, and its documentation. The project materials stay at their source; no source code is executed by this archive.

Sources: Badge project · Manufacturer device page.

CPU, MCU, and FPGA are different roles

A CPU executes instructions. A microcontroller integrates a CPU with memory and peripherals suited to controlling a device. An FPGA provides configurable digital logic and can also contain or implement a CPU design. Novena’s combination of a processor, FPGA, and memory is a concrete example of these roles complementing one another rather than being interchangeable labels.

Sources: Novena design account · PIC datasheet.

Interfaces and the limits of labels

JTAGulator is a research instrument for identifying interfaces on hardware. JTAG and SWD are associated with debugging; UART is a serial communications interface and is not inherently a debugger. A board connector does not by itself reveal what access is authorized or what the device does. Good historical documentation preserves the schematic, device identity, version, and observed behavior.

Sources: JTAGulator project.

Inside the chip

Huang’s Baochip discussion connects silicon imagery and source-level understanding of memory structures. It extends the scale of inquiry from a whole board to the organization inside a chip. This archive links the creator’s images without copying them. A useful educational sequence is board → schematic → datasheet → firmware behavior → interfaces → architecture → repair or redesign, with findings recorded at each step.

Sources: Baochip analysis.

Plaintext version · Editorial standards

Follow the catalog

Title-keyword matches; this is an editorial browsing connection, not proof of historical influence.

  1. 2600 / article-index-entry / 1986

    NSA Wants a New Chip

    Author not cataloged · Issue/event Volume 3, number 10

  2. 2600 / article-index-entry / 1986

    New Chip Helps Sprint~

    Author not cataloged · Issue/event Volume 3, number 8

  3. DEF CON / main-track-talk / 2026

    Breaking Hardware CFI with Sigreturn

    Omri "beta_b0t" Ben Bassat · Issue/event 34

  4. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    Don’t waste your silicon: how optimized software can run 40% faster

    palinuro · Issue/event 34

  5. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    Double the Firmware, Double the Fun: Darknet DIY Badge Edition

    Gater_Byte · Issue/event 34

  6. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    From Pwnagotchi to Sovereign Silicon: The Case for Hackable AI

    evilbotnet · Issue/event 34

  7. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    GreyMecha/Army: How we made 400+ badges with FPGAs

    Hackin7 · Issue/event 34

  8. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    Hack the Airwaves – Embedded Wireless for Next-Gen Hackers

    Adventures of Illya · Issue/event 34

  9. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    Hacking Hearts by Reverse Engineering Pacemaker Firmware

    Marie Moe, Shayan Alinejad, Kristian Karlsen · Issue/event 34

  10. DEF CON / main-track-talk / 2026

    How much of our Bluetooth firmware reverse engineering work can now be automated with LLMs?

    Veronica Kovah, Xeno Kovah · Issue/event 34

  11. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    One Firmware Flaw, 70+ Device Models: Lessons in Industrial IoT Disclosure and Mitigation

    Weihan Goh, ZhengChao Wen · Issue/event 34

  12. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    Raiders of the Lost Firmware: A Hands-On Workshop in IoT Firmware Archaeology

    Simone Bossi, Luca Borzacchiello · Issue/event 34

  13. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    The Compiler Nobody Satisfactorily Tested: Supply-Chain Gaps in EV Charging Firmware

    Kangwon Lee · Issue/event 34

  14. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2026

    UAiRT: Over The Air UART

    Metehan Arslan, Samet Berk Simsek · Issue/event 34

  15. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    Behind the Badge: How We Used and Abused Hardware (again) to Create the AV Badge for DC33

    Adam Batori, Robert Pafford · Issue/event 33

  16. DEF CON / main-track-talk / 2025

    Binary Facades: Reversing approaches to extract embedded scripts in compiled macOS malware

    Patrick Wardle · Issue/event 33

  17. DEF CON / main-track-talk / 2025

    Emulating Embedded Linux Devices at Scale with Light-Touch Firmware Rehosting

    Sigusr Polke · Issue/event 33

  18. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    Firmware Decryption: For, and By, the Cryptographically Illiterate

    Craig Heffner · Issue/event 33

  19. DEF CON / main-track-talk / 2025

    Ghosts in the Machine Check - Conjuring Hardware Failures for Cross-ring Privilege Escalation

    Christopher "xoreaxeaxeax" Domas · Issue/event 33

  20. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    How AI + Hardware can Transforming Point-of-Care Workflows

    PamirAI · Issue/event 33

  21. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    MITRE eCTF: 10 Years of the Embedded Capture the Flag

    Kyle Skey · Issue/event 33

  22. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    Never enough about cameras - The firmware encryption keys hidden under the rug

    Alexandru Lazar · Issue/event 33

  23. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    Reconfigurable HSMs: Future-Proofing Hardware Security Against Evolving Threats

    Pablo Trujillo · Issue/event 33

  24. DEF CON / creator-talk-panel / 2025

    Rooting a Hikvision Camera via Firmware Modification

    Matt Brown · Issue/event 33

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