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Electron Applications

Subtechnique · ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015

Attributed source ↗ · Plaintext record · Complete record and assertions JSON

Inspect structured metadata and provenance
{
  "id": "ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015",
  "title": "Electron Applications",
  "type": "Subtechnique",
  "source_url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/015",
  "snapshot": "enterprise-attack-20.0.json",
  "status": "active",
  "rights": "Source metadata only; source notices retained; no operational prose or payloads",
  "review_status": "machine-extracted; source-specific checks passed, editorial review pending",
  "stix_id": "attack-pattern--561ae9aa-c28a-4144-9eec-e7027a14c8c3",
  "external_id": "T1218.015",
  "domain": "enterprise",
  "created": "2024-03-07T19:32:35.383Z",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T15:12:00.634Z",
  "version": "2.0",
  "aliases": [

  ],
  "tactics": [
    "stealth"
  ],
  "source_references": [
    {
      "source_name": "Electron 3",
      "url": "https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/electron-framework-security-issues/49035/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Electron Security",
      "url": "https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/using-native-node-modules"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Electron 6-8",
      "url": "https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Electron 1",
      "url": "https://www.mend.io/blog/theres-a-new-stealer-variant-in-town-and-its-using-electron-to-stay-fully-undetected/"
    },
    {
      "source_name": "Electron 2",
      "url": "https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2023/FIRSTCON23-TLP-CLEAR-Horejsi-Abusing-Electron-Based-Applications-in-Targeted-Attacks.pdf"
    }
  ]
}

Explicit source assertions (6)

First 80 shown here; the complete set is in this record’s JSON and plaintext. Each relationship retains its source and locator. No inferred relationships are added.

ATTACK:enterprise:M1050 → mitigates → ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--1803c9d0-8c13-461d-be06-68aa40901bce

ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015 → subtechnique-of → ATTACK:enterprise:T1218

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--2e06f20b-d93a-41b2-a5e3-87d1a4800a9f

ATTACK:enterprise:M1042 → mitigates → ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--3329382e-c40f-44a2-82c3-fb1479c3b6d2

Electron Security 2

ATTACK:enterprise:S1213 → uses → ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--4d6143a5-73dc-4e72-8677-6b26dbfaa114

TrendMicro LummaStealer 2025

ATTACK:enterprise:M1038 → mitigates → ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--4e1b6f6e-6741-45e7-856b-1efdb2f50ba3

Electron Security 3

ATTACK:enterprise:C0057 → uses → ATTACK:enterprise:T1218.015

MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.

Assertion source · Locator: relationship--eeea8a71-82d7-4f7e-93d2-8c652ebb3c47

Unit42 3cx supply chain 2023

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