Temporary Elevated Cloud Access
Subtechnique · ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005
Attributed source ↗ · Plaintext record · Complete record and assertions JSON
Inspect structured metadata and provenance
{
"id": "ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005",
"title": "Temporary Elevated Cloud Access",
"type": "Subtechnique",
"source_url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005",
"snapshot": "enterprise-attack-20.0.json",
"status": "active",
"rights": "Source metadata only; source notices retained; no operational prose or payloads",
"review_status": "machine-extracted; source-specific checks passed, editorial review pending",
"stix_id": "attack-pattern--6fa224c7-5091-4595-bf15-3fc9fe2f2c7c",
"external_id": "T1548.005",
"domain": "enterprise",
"created": "2023-07-10T16:37:15.672Z",
"modified": "2026-05-12T15:12:00.641Z",
"version": "2.0",
"aliases": [
],
"tactics": [
"privilege-escalation"
],
"source_references": [
{
"source_name": "AWS PassRole",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_roles_use_passrole.html"
},
{
"source_name": "CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/observations-from-the-stellarparticle-campaign/"
},
{
"source_name": "Google Cloud Just in Time Access 2023",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/architecture/manage-just-in-time-privileged-access-to-project"
},
{
"source_name": "Google Cloud Service Account Authentication Roles",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-permissions"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Impersonation and EWS in Exchange",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/client-developer/exchange-web-services/impersonation-and-ews-in-exchange"
},
{
"source_name": "Azure Just in Time Access 2023",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-resource-manager/managed-applications/approve-just-in-time-access"
},
{
"source_name": "Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/"
},
{
"source_name": "Rhino Google Cloud Privilege Escalation",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/gcp/privilege-escalation-google-cloud-platform-part-1/"
},
{
"source_name": "Hunters Domain Wide Delegation Google Workspace 2023",
"url": "https://www.hunters.security/en/blog/delefriend-a-newly-discovered-design-flaw-in-domain-wide-delegation-could-leave-google-workspace-vulnerable-for-takeover"
},
{
"source_name": "Palo Alto Unit 42 Google Workspace Domain Wide Delegation 2023",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/critical-risk-in-google-workspace-delegation-feature/"
}
]
}Explicit source assertions (2)
First 80 shown here; the complete set is in this record’s JSON and plaintext. Each relationship retains its source and locator. No inferred relationships are added.
ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005 → subtechnique-of → ATTACK:enterprise:T1548
MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.
Assertion source · Locator: relationship--3dd34032-bef9-4dec-bed4-77b670c70453
ATTACK:enterprise:M1018 → mitigates → ATTACK:enterprise:T1548.005
MITRE ATT&CK: Source assertion; no new actor identity, alias equivalence, CVE exploitation or causal inference. Procedure prose omitted.
Assertion source · Locator: relationship--b811da67-8da1-4f2e-aae0-8666093cf95d